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Abstract
The boom and bust in capital flows to the New Member States (NMS) has 
received considerable attention, relatively little has, however, been written about 
capital flows to the Western Balkans, often perceived to be ‘late arrivals’ to 
large capital flows. We find that while financial integration took off later in the 
Western Balkans, it has increased rapidly, despite lower capital account openness. 
Capital inflows are (perhaps surprisingly) diverse in terms of source countries, 
but broadly similar in terms of drivers and composition, though with equity 
shares higher than they were in the NMS at comparable levels of development. 
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1  Introduction12
The past 25 years have witnessed dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. In the 
late  1990s and especially the early  2000s private capital inflows to the later 
New Member States (NMS) increased rapidly, driven by overall capital scarcity, 
relatively high initial levels of human capital, and the institutional anchor 
of potential EU membership. While these flows increased investment and 
employment, and provided financing for external current account imbalances, 
they also increased the countries’ exposure to external shocks. The global financial 
crisis triggered a sharp drop in capital flows, raising important questions about 
the vulnerability of these economies—a slowdown in capital flows could have 
important spillover effects on the real economy, through financial channels (on 
account of cross-border bank flows) or employment (particularly related to foreign 
direct investment)—and about the ways policy can respond most effectively3.
The boom and bust in capital flows to the NMS has received a considerable 
amount of attention; foreign direct investment (FDI) and bank flows to the 
region, and countries’ participation in regional supply chains have been well-
documented. Relatively little has, however, been written about capital flows 
to the Western Balkans. While sharing many of the characteristics of the 
NMS, transition in the Western Balkans has lagged behind that in the NMS, 
as reflected for instance in a still relatively less developed private sector, and 
correspondingly high unemployment rates. The Western Balkan economies are 
also often perceived to be less open ‘late arrivals’ to large capital flows. 
1 A version of this paper was previously published as a working paper: Kóczán, Zsóka. (2017). Late to the game? 
Capital flows to the Western Balkans. IMF Working Paper No. 17/92.
2 Throughout the paper the term Western Balkans refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Central and Eastern Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Southeastern Europe includes Bulgaria and Romania. Central and Southeastern Europe 
refers to these seven countries jointly. New Member States (NMS) also includes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Emerging Europe includes the NMS and the Western Balkan economies. In compressing the experience of 16 
countries over 15 years, the paper inevitably focuses on broad common themes, and cannot do justice to the 
nuance and diversity of individual country experiences. While Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and differences 
in the economic and institutional contexts between the EU and non-EU countries are likely to affect trade and 
financial flows, it is treated here as part of the Western Balkans country group as most of the analysis focuses on 
the period predating its accession.
3 See also for example, Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Kose (2010) and Hegerty (2009) on the macroeconomic 
implications of large capital inflows.
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This paper aims to examine how capital flows to the Western Balkans compare 
with flows to the NMS, in terms of levels as well as dynamics. Have the Western 
Balkans indeed opened up later and does this still translate into lower capital 
inflows when compared to the NMS? How do they measure up to the NMS 
at comparable levels of development? Do capital flows in the Western Balkans 
respond to the same factors as in the NMS? Have the Western Balkans missed out 
on rapid capital inflows as a driver of growth, or has their ‘late arrival’ resulted in 
a less pronounced boom-bust cycle? 
The paper is structured as follows: section two provides a brief overview of the 
large literature on capital flows, focusing on the Western Balkans and the NMS. 
Section three discusses the data used, and section four provides descriptive 
evidence on the evolution of stocks as well as flows. Section five outlines the 
empirical methodology used to examine the drivers of capital flows and presents 
the results, while section six brings the conclusion and policy recommendations.
2  Literature Review
An extensive empirical literature has sought to explain the determinants of cross-
border capital flows, focusing on gross inflows and/or net flows. GDP growth 
rate differentials and global risk aversion have typically emerged as the most 
robust statistically significant determinants of aggregate capital flows to emerging 
market economies (see Ahmed & Zlate, 2013; Nier, Sedik, & Mondino 2014; 
Koepke, 2015; and IMF, 2016a).
Numerous studies have examined the experience of Central and Eastern Europe 
during the early years of transition. Early work by Lankes, Stern, Blumenthal, and 
Weigl (1999) and Claessens, Oks, and Polastri (2000) noted a dramatic increase 
in private capital flows (especially FDI and portfolio equity investment) in the 
first decade of transition. Árvai (2005) and von Hagen and Siedschlag (2010) 
examined the effects of capital account liberalization. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006) analyzed the evolution of net external asset positions and highlighted 
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the large accumulation of net external liabilities, with FDI flows especially 
prominent in financing external current account imbalances.
The boom-bust cycle of the NMS has also received a considerable amount of 
attention. Bakker and Gulde (2010) argued that the credit boom-bust cycle was 
to a large extent the result of factors external to the region, as rapid credit growth 
followed due to high liquidity in global markets and the attractiveness of ‘new 
Europe’ for capital flows, but that policies and policy failures (in particular, 
overly expansionary macroeconomic settings and excessively optimistic views on 
prudential risks) also played a critical role. Jevčák, Setzer, and Suardi (2010) also 
found that external factors (such as the euro area macroeconomic and financial 
conditions and risk aversion) played a role in explaining foreign capital flows, but 
that the responsiveness of capital flows to global factors varied across recipient 
countries. Globan (2015) argued that the macroeconomic factors in the euro 
zone were becoming increasingly dominant determinants, especially after EU 
accession, and that the rising importance of push factors was also connected 
with the higher volatility of capital inflows, making host countries more prone 
to sudden stop episodes. The role of EU accession was emphasized earlier by 
Buch and Piazolo (2001). Brixiova, Vartia, and Wörgötter (2010) noted that in 
Estonia an open capital account, the prospect for EU entry, and the currency 
board facilitated massive capital inflows. Meyer (1995), Keren, and Ofer (2002), 
and Jimborean and Kelber (2017) focused on FDI flows and pointed to the roles 
of proximity to Western Europe, institutional factors, and external, as well as 
domestic determinants, respectively. Mitra (2011) looked at data on the sectoral 
composition of inflows to the NMS and found that capital flows into real estate 
had a greater impact on swings in GDP than on other sectors, irrespective of a 
country’s exchange rate or fiscal policy.
Few papers focused explicitly on capital flows to the Western Balkans. A recent 
book by Murgasova, Ilahi, Miniane, Scott, and Vladikova-Hollar (2015) 
reviewed macroeconomic developments in the Western Balkans over the past 15 
years, including external balances and capital inflows, and highlighted increasing 
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(mainly FDI) inflows in the boom years, and their relative stability in the post-
crisis period—in contrast with the experience of the NMS, which saw declining 
and eventually negative capital inflows. Ganić (2013) examined the increased 
integration of the Western Balkans in global economic flows, highlighted the 
importance of geographic factors, and the corresponding prominent role of 
the EU as a source of (especially FDI) flows to the region. Gabrisch (2015) 
used Granger causality tests to examine linkages between changes in the real 
exchange rate and net capital inflows to the Western Balkans and found that 
changes in net capital flows preceded changes in relative unit labor costs. Estrin 
and Uvalic (2014, 2016) focused on FDI flows and noted that even when 
the size of their economies, the distance from the source economies, and the 
institutional quality and prospects of EU membership are considered, Western 
Balkan countries receive less FDI than other transition countries. Kersan-Škabić 
and Tijanić (2014) examined the impact of FDI on regional development in 
Croatia and found that investment (both domestic and FDI), labor productivity, 
and exports have a positive and significant influence on regional development. 
Kovtun, Meyer Cirkel, Murgasova, Smith, and Tambunlertchai (2014) looked 
at the employment impact of capital inflows and highlighted that while in the 
NMS the infusion of capital from abroad (especially via greenfield FDI) played 
a key role in developing new businesses or even new sectors and provided a 
chance for workers dismissed from the declining areas to be reabsorbed by new 
economic activities, delayed transition and low FDI put the Western Balkans at 
a disadvantage in diversifying away from traditional sectors. 
The aim of this paper is to build on this literature, while providing value added 
by integrating the analysis of flows as well as stock positions, relying on a more 
comparative analysis relative to the NMS, and extending the analysis to the 
roles of common and country-specific factors, in the boom years as well as in 
the aftermath. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to 
examine these questions for the Western Balkans in this framework.
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The empirical framework used in the following sections is motivated by 
international investors’ optimal portfolio allocation decisions. Cross-border 
capital flows reflect decisions by residents and non-residents to allocate investments 
across countries. Investments in a particular country are more desirable the 
higher the risk-adjusted returns, relative to the returns from investing in other 
countries. Expected returns from investing in a particular country can hence be 
related to factors such as growth and interest rate differentials (and factors that 
may influence these—for instance, changes in countries’ terms of trades, which 
could be significant during the time period examined here), the risk appetite 
of investors, the quality of domestic policymaking and institutions (affecting 
country’s risk as well as expected returns), and barriers to investment, such as 
capital controls. Capital flows to a given country are thus expected to be higher 
where risk-adjusted returns are higher (for instance, due to higher relative growth, 
higher relative interest rates, favorable terms of trade, or better institutions and 
policies) and lower if global risk aversion or country risk are higher, and if capital 
controls are more stringent. 
3  Data
The following analysis relies on quarterly data on capital flows from the Financial 
Flows Analytics database and annual data on stocks from the External Wealth of 
Nations database. The sample covers the Western Balkans, as well as the NMS 
and the EU-15 for comparison, over the period 1995–20144. 
In all of the following, capital inflows are defined as net acquisition of domestic 
assets by non-residents; capital outflows are defined as net acquisition of foreign 
assets by residents, excluding reserve assets; net capital inflows are defined as the 
difference between capital inflows and outflows. Net capital inflows and changes 
in reserve assets together constitute the financial account balance, as defined in 
the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual. Total gross inflows and outflows exclude 
4 Some of the analysis focuses on the EU-14, excluding Luxembourg as a financial center.
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derivatives flows; equity flows refer to the sum of FDI and portfolio equity; debt 
flows refer to the sum of portfolio debt and other flows. All flows are measured 
as shares of GDP.
In the panel regressions, country-specific forecasted growth and interest rate 
differentials are measured as the difference between the country’s own rate and 
a simple average of EU-14 (or NMS or Western Balkan) rates. Real interest rates 
are based on policy rates, deflated using one-year ahead World Economic Outlook 
inflation forecasts. Institutional quality is measured using the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) rule of law measure. While this is used as one possible proxy 
for institutional quality due to its better cross-country coverage than other (more 
disaggregated) indicators, results are robust to using alternative measures (which 
are often highly correlated). Capital account openness is measured using the 
Chinn and Ito (2006) index. A large IMF-supported adjustment program is 
defined as growing IMF borrowing above 100 percent of the respective country 
quota and is included here both as an indicator of the country already experiencing 
distress, and possibly a factor lowering country risk. Fixed and floating exchange 
rates are defined using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) classification. Regional growth differentials are 
defined using simple averages of Western Balkans (or NMS) and EU-14 growth 
rates. Global risk aversion is measured using the logarithm of the CBOE S&P 
100 Volatility Index (VXO). The change in the oil price refers to the year-on-year 
change in the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price.
4  Descriptives
While, as noted earlier, the evolution of the external positions of the NMS has 
been well-documented, relatively little has been written on the Western Balkans, 
especially since the crisis. Before turning to an analysis of the determinants of 
capital flows, this section thus aims to provide an overview of the evolution of 
the flows, and correspondingly, external stock positions of the Western Balkan 
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economies over the past two decades, and examine where the region is now, 
particularly in comparison to the NMS and the EU-15.
As noted in the existing literature, capital flows to the Western Balkans 
arrived somewhat later than to the NMS. Their experience during the boom 
years of  2003–2007, however, followed (a perhaps surprisingly) similar trend 
(Figure 1, panel 1)5. Capital inflows as a share of GDP increased from about 
10  percent in  2003 to around 35  percent at their peak in 2007 in both the 
Western Balkans and in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (the Baltics 
saw an increase from about 15 percent to 40 percent of GDP). This does, however, 
mask heterogeneity within the region: Montenegro constitutes an outlier in 
much of the following analysis, characterized by much larger (particularly real 
estate-related) flows than the other economies in the region (capital inflows there 
peaked at 84 percent of GDP in 2007).


























































































































































































































Source: IMF Financial Flow Analytics database.
In some cases, geographical proximity and relatively cheap labor allowed these 
economies to become part of an integrated cross-border production chain 
5 Regional averages in Figures 1–4 are computed as simple averages of capital flows to GDP across countries. 
Alternatively, they could have been computed as total flows as a share of total GDP. Given the very different sizes 
of Western Balkan economies, both carry problems: in the first case due to the disproportionate influence of 
Montenegro and Kosovo, while in the second case, Croatia and Serbia would dominate the charts. As the aim here 
is to reflect diversity across the region, countries are given equal weight.
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(see Murgasova et al., 2015). Geographic proximity seems to be an important 
driver of capital flows, with West European countries being the dominant 
external investors in the region. Most of the portfolio investment in the Western 
Balkans comes from the EU-15: 60–80 percent of total portfolio investment in 
the Western Balkans on average, similar to the ratio for the NMS (Appendix 
Figure 1, panel 1). Investment from the NMS remained below 5 percent even 
at its peak, being directed mostly to Croatia and more recently to Montenegro. 
Intra-regional investment remains negligible in comparison; even within the 
NMS it is mostly below 5 percent, with the exceptions of Latvia (with a peak at 
10 percent) and Slovakia (with a peak at over 20 percent).
Within the EU-15 the picture is perhaps surprisingly diverse (Appendix Figure 1, 
panel 2). Austria, Germany, and Greece play prominent roles, to a lesser extent 
so do France, the UK, and Italy (mostly in Albania). While bilateral data on 
FDI is less reliable and patchier than for portfolio flows, it broadly confirms the 
pattern, with Austria, Germany, and Greece playing important roles, a larger role 
for the NMS and (as expected) a smaller role for financial centers (Luxembourg 
and the UK). The pattern is similar to that observed in the NMS, where Austria 
and Germany are especially significant; Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are 
prominent investors in the Baltics and Greece is important for Bulgaria and 
Romania6. 
Gross capital outflows, on the other hand, played only a relatively minor role 
in the Western Balkans (Figure 1, panel 2) and were mostly characterized by 
volatility, with no clear patterns over time. This was qualitatively similar to 
the experience of Southeastern Europe, whereas Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Baltics saw increasing inflows in the boom accompanied by increasing 
outflows—in line with the positive correlation between inflows and outflows 
documented by Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmuckler (2013). 
6 Bilateral investment flows also correlate strongly with migrant destinations, except for Luxembourg, as a financial 
center, and Ireland and the UK, whose labor markets have remained relatively closed to the Western Balkans. This 
could be driven by a combination of geographic (linguistic) factors or historical ties driving both investment and 
migration patterns, or by investment by migrants and their children in their home countries.
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Booming capital inflows translated into the accumulation of large net external 
liabilities, in the Western Balkans as in the NMS (Figure 2). Both net equity and 
net debt positions worsened, and while in the 1990s equity shares in the Western 
Balkans were even smaller than in the NMS, by 2007 both net equity and net debt 
positions were comparable to those of the NMS. Financial integration (measured 
as the sum of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP) increased, though 
it remains below the levels observed in the NMS (Appendix Figure 2). 
Capital inflows to the Western Balkans consisted primarily of FDI and bank 
loans (Figure 3, panels 1–4)7. This composition of inflows is, again, consistent 
with patterns observed in the NMS8. As in the NMS, capital outflows from the 
Western Balkans were also predominantly FDI and bank flows, though with a 
smaller share of the latter, and (as noted above) lower overall outflows (Figure 3, 
panels 5–8).
Figure 2:  Net Equity and Debt Positions, % of GDP



















































































































































































Note: Net equity (debt) positions refer to assets minus equity (debt) liabilities. 
Source: External Wealth of Nations database.
7 For the 1995–2014 period as a whole, FDI accounted for around half of all inflows, while ‘other investment flows’ 
(mostly bank lending) constituted a further 40 percent. During  the 2006–2008 period, bank inflows gained 
importance as foreign bank networks became more prevalent in the Western Balkans.
8 Portfolio inflows were small or even negative: portfolio equity (debt) flows averaged around 0.2 (1) percent of GDP 
in the Western Balkans; portfolio debt flows were only slightly higher in the NMS.
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Figure 3:  Capital Inflows and Outflows in the Western Balkans and the NMS, by Type of 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF Financial Flow Analytics database.
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Correspondingly, in the early stages of transition, most external liabilities were in 
the form of external debt. On the external asset side, foreign exchange reserves 
and other debt assets accounted for the lion’s share of Western Balkans’ holdings 
in the 1990s, as in the NMS. The share of equities increased in both assets and 
liabilities, though it increased later for assets and remains at a lower level, and 
further behind the NMS (Figure 4).
Figure 4:  Equity and Reserves Shares, in %










































































































































































































































































Notes: Equity shares refer to shares of equity assets (liabilities) in total external assets (liabilities). Reserves share 
refers to the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total external assets. 
Source: External Wealth of Nations database.
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Today, liabilities as a percentage of GDP are broadly comparable to the NMS, 
while assets remain somewhat lower (Figure 5, panels 1 and 2)9. Equity shares 
in liabilities are comparable to those in the NMS, while equity shares in assets 
remain lower (Figure 5, panels 3 and 4).
Figure 5:  External Positions in the Western Balkans, the NMS and the EU-14, 2014
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Net equity position Net debt position
Notes: Equity shares refer to shares of equity assets (liabilities) in total external assets (liabilities). Reserves share 
refers to the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total external assets. Net equity (debt) positions refer to equity 
(debt) assets minus equity (debt) liabilities.
Source: External Wealth of Nations database.
Looking at the evolution of capital flows and external positions in the Western 
Balkans thus points to important similarities with the NMS. While slightly 
9 Within the region, Montenegro is characterized by much higher liabilities and worse net positions, while Kosovo 
has better net debt positions.
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‘late to the game’, the Western Balkan economies appear to have caught up 
rapidly with the NMS (though both regions contain heterogeneity in country 
experiences within them). Capital flows account for broadly comparable shares 
of GDP, and consist mainly of FDI and bank lending, though outflows still play 
a smaller role in the Western Balkans. Equity shares are far above what would be 
expected given their level of development (Figure 6), and reserve shares are much 
higher in the Western Balkans than in the NMS. 
Figure 6:  Equity and Reserve Shares in the Western Balkans and the NMS, by Level of 
Development
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Notes: Equity shares refer to shares of equity assets (liabilities) in total external assets (liabilities). Reserves share 
refers to the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total external assets. Dots refer to country-years, including the 
Western Balkans and the NMS for the period 1995–2014.
Sources: External Wealth of Nations database, World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset, and the IMF 
World Economic Outlook database.
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These similarities, however, hide a marked difference in capital account openness 
(Appendix Figure 1). Capital account openness increased in both the Western 
Balkans and the NMS in the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, while this 
trend continued in the NMS until the global financial crisis, reaching levels close 
to those observed in the EU-14, the Western Balkans have, on average, remained 
much more closed. The relative similarity of capital inflows is thus all the more 
striking, suggesting that factors such as a skilled, relatively cheap labor force and 
expectations of potential future EU membership were more important in driving 
investment decisions than the extent of capital controls. 
5  Determinants of Capital Flows
Having examined the evolution of external positions and the behavior of capital 
flows to the Western Balkans, the following section aims to extend the analysis 
by looking at the determinants of capital flows, examining the role of common 
factors, as well as structural characteristics and policy frameworks. As discussed 
above, the empirical frameworks used here are motivated by international 
investors’ optimal portfolio allocation decisions, where investments in a particular 
country are more desirable the higher the risk-adjusted returns, relative to the 
returns from investing in other countries. 
Two complementary estimation strategies are used10. First, we examine the role of 
common factors in driving capital flows to the region. To do so, average capital 
flows to the Western Balkans (and for comparison, to the NMS) are regressed 
on key economic explanatory factors such as the growth differential between the 
10 The estimation strategy closely follows that of the IMF (2016a). The macroeconomic variables used in the 
regressions, such as GDP and capital flows, influence each other in complex ways, making it difficult to obtain 
clear causal estimates. The main goal of the analysis is therefore to establish robust correlations, examining which 
variables track the evolution of capital flows more strongly.
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region and the EU-14, interest rates in the EU-1411, global investors’ risk appetite 
(measured using the logarithm of the VXO), and percentage changes in oil prices 
(controlling also for seasonal dummy variables):
( )14 140 1 2 3 6WB EU EU oiltt t t tt tKflows g g ir riskaversion P S             , (1) 
in which ( )14WB EUt tg g  is the common growth rate differential between the 
Western Balkans and the EU-14, and 14EUtir  is a simple average of real policy 
rates in the EU-14. 
Secondly, the cross-country distribution of gross capital inflows is modeled 
using a panel regression (with country-fixed effects) of capital inflows on 
country-specific economic factors, such as country-specific growth differentials, 
institutions (proxied in the baseline using the WGI measure on the rule of law), 
capital controls, whether the country is under an IMF program (IMF borrowing 
is more than 100 percent of its quota and increasing), and percentage changes in 
the terms of trade (controlling for time-fixed effects):
( )140 1 2 3
4 5
EU
it it it itit
it it t it
Kflows g g institutional quality capital controls
IMFloan termsof trade T
   
   
     
                  (2)
in which ( )14EUit itg g  is the growth rate differential between the country’s own 
growth rate and a simple average of EU-14 growth rates, and Tt are a set of 
quarter dummy variables (to account for possible seasonality in the regression 
framework directly)12. 
Within each step, inflows and outflows are examined separately given evidence 
that gross inflows and gross outflows have in their own right—rather than just 
11 Our baseline specification excludes interest rates in the Western Balkans as consistent long time-series are 
unfortunately difficult to obtain. While for some countries data on policy rates are available, others only have 
deposit rates. Results are very similar when adding interest rates for the Western Balkans as well (Appendix Tables 
1 and 2), with high interest rates in the region often mopping up the effects of increasing global risk aversion. 
Interest rates are included in levels rather than as differentials, since interest rate differentials are highly collinear 
with growth differentials and thus difficult to separate empirically.
12 Results are very similar when examining seasonally adjusted series instead.
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in terms of the net gap between them—a distinct importance in determining 
systemic risk (Avdjiev, McCauley, & Shin, 2015). 
Average growth rate differentials between the Western Balkans and the EU-
14, interest rates in the EU-14, and global investor risk appetite are estimated 
to be statistically significant determinants of average capital inflows (Table 1). 
The results are qualitatively similar for the NMS, with somewhat larger effects 
of EU-14 interest rates and somewhat smaller effects of the growth differential 
(though these effects are difficult to separate empirically; Figure 7). These factors 
also appear to explain more of the variation in the NMS than in the Western 
Balkans. Examining growth differentials of the Western Balkans relative to 
the NMS rather than the EU-14 and controlling for interest rates in the NMS 
yields similar results. EU-14 and NMS growth and interest rates followed similar 
trends in the period examined here, thus again making it difficult to separate 
their effects empirically (Figure 7).
Figure 7:  Average Growth and Real Interest Rates, in %




















































































































































































































WB NMS EU-14 NMS EU-14
Sources: IMF Global Data Source database and the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
These results are broadly in line with the existing literature on the NMS, which 
highlighted the role of push factors (a favorable global environment, characterized 
by declining interest rates, abundant liquidity, low risk aversion, and low global 
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volatility produced a willing supply of capital, especially from the EU-15; see 
Bakker & Gulde, 2010) and pull factors (the anticipation of rapid growth and 
high returns, seen as a natural part of the catch-up process and as the result of 
low wages and low capital-labor ratios, as well as post-transition reforms; see 
Lipschitz, Lane, & Mourmouras, 2002). 
Table 1:  The Role of Global Factors in Explaining Average Gross Capital Inflows
Growth differential (WB - EU-14) 2.648***   2.203***
(0.540)   (0.628) 
Growth differential (NMS - EU-14)  1.755***                 
 (0.632)                 
Growth differential (WB - NMS)   1.152** 0.571 
  (0.564) (0.540) 
Interest rates (EU-14) 2.008*** 3.684***  1.770* 
(0.628) (0.663)  (0.998) 
Interest rates (NMS)   3.406*** 1.024 
  (0.880) (0.860) 
Global risk aversion (log) -3.783* -5.785*** -4.342 -5.150 
(2.146) (2.117) (2.818) (3.188) 
Change in the oil price -0.0142 0.0348 -0.00646 -0.0194 
(0.0312) (0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0341) 
Sample WB NMS WB WB
Number of obs. 63 63 63 63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.325 0.572 0.192 0.318 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
Seasonal dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported.
Source: Author’s calculations.
To gauge the economic significance of the explanatory variables, panels 1 and 
2 in Figure  8 compare actual average capital inflows to the Western Balkans 
with predictions from this regression and contributions from each explanatory 
variable. Corresponding results for the NMS are reported in panels 3 and 4. 
Panels 1 and 3 point to a tight empirical link between the actual and predicted 
capital inflows. Panels 2 and 4 suggest that the decline in inflows shows a strong 
association with the shrinking real GDP growth differential relative to the 
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EU-14. Diminished growth prospects counterbalance the effect of decreasing risk 
aversion, which would predict an increase in capital inflows during this period13.
Figure 8:  The Role of Common Factors for Capital Inflows
1. Actual and predicted capital inflows,















































































































2. Predicted capital inflows and contributions,
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3. Actual and predicted capital inflows,















































































































4. Predicted capital inflows and contributions,


















































































































Growth differential (NMS - EU-14)
Interest rates (EU-14)
Global risk aversion
Notes: Average capital flows are regressed on growth differentials, advanced economy interest rates, global risk 
aversion, the change in the oil price, and seasonal dummies. Contributions of the change in the oil price are very small 
and thus not reported. Predicted capital flows refer to the predicted values from this regression.
Sources: Fernandez, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015), IMF Financial Flow Analytics database, Global 
Data Source, Haver Analytics, IMF World Economic Outlook database, and the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators dataset.
13 Regression specifications, as outlined in the beginning of section five, include seasonal dummy variables. Their 
effects are statistically significant and are included in the predicted values shown in Figures 8 and 9. 
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Predictions underestimate the boom to a certain extent both in the Western 
Balkans as well as in the NMS, possibly pointing to some overoptimism, beyond 
what was warranted purely based on growth and interest rate differentials. On 
average, they match the slowdown in capital inflows since 2007 in the Western 
Balkans quite well, though they appear to overpredict capital inflows to the 
NMS, suggesting that, perhaps, it is not inflows to the Western Balkans that 
held up unusually well, but flows to the NMS, which underperformed relative 
to what could have been expected given the past relationship of capital flows to 
growth and interest rate differentials—perhaps as a natural consequence of the 
catch-up process to the EU-15. Continued FDI inflows to the Western Balkans 
could also have included finalizations of projects launched before the start of the 
global financial crisis, as well as some new greenfield investments that continue 
to be attracted by lower factor costs and in some cases, lower exchange rates (see 
also Jevčák et al., 2010)14. In terms of cross-country variation, better governance 
and competition policy have been associated with smaller drops in capital flows. 
The relative illiquidity of assets may also have mitigated foreign investors’ ability 
to withdraw capital quickly. 
Figure  9 presents symmetric results for capital outflows, with the regression 
results reported in Table 2. Outflows from the Western Balkans have been volatile 
and appear hard to predict using these explanatory variables, with seasonality 
dominating the predicted values15. As noted earlier, outflows are still much lower 
in the Western Balkans than in the NMS, with fewer domestic institutional 
investors. Predictions for the NMS do somewhat better, capturing the pick-up in 
outflows that accompanied the increase in inflows in the boom years. Global risk 
aversion appears to be the key driver of outflows from the NMS.
14 An in-depth analysis of the pull factors for FDI flows is outside the scope of this paper.
15 As expected, seasonally adjusted series, as well as predicted values excluding the effects of the seasonal dummies 
are much smoother and show no clear pattern over time. 
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Table 2:  The Role of the Global Factors in Explaining Average Gross Capital Outflows
Growth differential (WB - EU-14) 0.219   0.0295 
(0.291)   (0.354) 
Growth differential (NMS - EU-14)  0.508                 
 (0.350)                 
Growth differential (WB - NMS)   0.453* 0.421 
  (0.258) (0.278) 
Interest rates (EU-14) -0.377 1.347***  -0.209 
(0.455) (0.501)  (0.490) 
Interest rates (NMS)   0.0295 0.141 
  (0.366) (0.514) 
Global risk aversion (log) 0.164 -5.792*** -1.188 -0.962 
(1.344) (1.293) (1.494) (1.939) 
Change in the oil price 0.00103 0.00196 -0.00644 -0.00409 
(0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0152) (0.0171) 
Sample WB NMS WB WB
Number of obs. 63 63 63 63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.393 0.264 0.239 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
Seasonal dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
While these results point to the role of common factors, their importance 
depends on policy characteristics that are country-specific (Figure 10). Results 
are qualitatively similar in the Western Balkans and the NMS:
•	 Economies that are financially more open appear more exposed to the common 
trend in capital inflows to the region: a higher share of the total variance 
of capital inflows is explained by the common time effect (controlling for 
differences in countries’ growth performance) in countries with more open 
capital accounts. 
•	 Larger, less financially developed, less liquid countries are also less exposed 
to common trends, in line with the results of Eichengreen and Gupta (2014).
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Figure 9:  The Role of Common Factors for Capital Outflows
1. Actual and predicted capital outflows,



































































































2. Predicted capital outflows and contributions,
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3. Actual and predicted capital outflows,

































































































4. Predicted capital outflows and contributions,





































































































































Notes: Average capital flows are regressed on growth differentials, advanced economy interest rates, global risk 
aversion, the change in the oil price, and seasonal dummies. Contributions of the change in the oil price are very small 
and thus not reported. Predicted capital flows refer to the predicted values from this regression.
Sources: Fernandez et al. (2015), IMF Financial Flow Analytics database, Global Data Source, Haver Analytics, IMF 
World Economic Outlook database, and the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators dataset.
•	 More flexible exchange rates also reduce the share of the total variance of 
capital inflows explained by common factors16. Countries that have flexible 
exchange rate regimes would tend to see immediate currency depreciations 
16 A large literature has studied the effectiveness of the exchange rate as a shock absorber. There is scarce evidence, 
however, on its role in smoothing the global capital flow cycle. Magud, Reinhart, and Vesperoni (2014) provide 
evidence that exchange rate flexibility smoothens the domestic credit cycle but find no evidence that exchange rate 
flexibility dampens capital flows per se in their regression analysis.
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in response to a broader downward trend in the supply of capital. By making 
domestic assets cheaper, a weaker currency would tend to attract capital into 
the country. Thus, exchange rate flexibility would reduce the sensitivity of 
capital inflows to global factors17.
•	 Countries that have higher reserves and lower public debt tend to have a 
lower percentage of the fluctuations in capital inflows attributable to common 
factors. Because higher reserves and lower public debt reduce country risk, 
foreign investors would be less tempted to pull out from countries with those 
characteristics, making their capital inflows more resilient to shifts in the 
global factor affecting all the emerging market economies.





























































































































































































































































































Notes: R-squares form a regression of capital inflows on average capital inflows, normalized using within-group 
standard deviations of flows; base group set to 1. Fernandez et al. (2015) measure for controls on capital inflows; split 
at 0.5. Fixed and floating exchange rates are defined using the IMF’s AREAER classification. High and low reserves 
are measured in months of imports and are split at the sample median. High and low government debt is split at the 
sample median. 
Sources: Fernandez et al. (2015), IMF Financial Flow Analytics database, IMF AREAER database, and the IMF 
World Economic Outlook database.
17 It should, however, be added that the classification used here refers to de facto exchange rate regimes. Examining 
effective exchange rate flexibility using the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ‘fear of floating’ index suggests that no 
currency in the Western Balkans is effectively floating, with the partial exception of Serbia (IMF, 2016b). While 
the larger variance explained by common factors for peggers could be driven by differences in the composition 
of flows (in the NMS peggers attracted more bank flows than floaters, especially during the boom years, while 
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The second step of the analysis focuses on the role of structural characteristics 
and policies in shaping the dynamics of capital flows to the Western Balkans. 
To this end, the section uses a panel-data specification that relates country-
specific capital flows to: country-specific growth differentials, an indicator of 
institutional quality, the degree to which capital inflows are restricted by law, 
whether the country is under a large IMF-sponsored adjustment program, 
changes in its terms of trade, and time-fixed effects. The regression (shown in 
Table 3), results in positive and significant coefficients on the growth differential 
and institutional quality18. Baseline regressions are based on an unbalanced 
panel for the period 2000–2015. Since the global financial crisis could have 
affected the responses of capital flows to changes in various characteristics, a 
robustness check examined the same regression, while excluding the years 2007, 
2008, and 2009. As expected, the growth differential is still highly significant 
(now for both the Western Balkans and the NMS), while institutional quality is 
no longer significant, but still large and positive. Results are robust to controlling 
for workers’ remittances as a share of GDP, which—although large for Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia—does not have a significant 
effect on capital flows for the region as a whole. Results are similar in sign 
and magnitude, though not statistically significant for the NMS. Country-by-
country time series regressions, however, point to considerable heterogeneity 
across countries in the association between growth and capital flows (Figure 11), 
with the effect being largest in Montenegro, but also particularly large in Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
18 Baseline regressions use the WGI ‘rule of law’ measure. Results are qualitatively similar when using alternative 
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Note: Coefficient estimates based on country-by-country regressions of capital inflows on real GDP growth.
Sources: IMF Financial Flow Analytics databse and the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
Table 3:  The Role of Country-Specific Factors in Explaining Gross Capital Inflows
Growth differential (country - EU-14) 0.618* 0.660
(0.213) (0.530)






IMF program 7.010 2.996
(3.772) (3.922)
Change in terms of trade 0.0925 -0.00867
(0.312) (0.374)
Sample WB NMS
Number of obs. 196 560
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.299
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 4:  The Role of Country-Specific Factors in Explaining Gross Capital Outflows
Growth differential (country - EU-14) 0.542* -0.279
(0.192) (0.509)






IMF program 0.781 -0.0673
(1.340) (1.774)
Change in terms of trade 0.111 -0.260
(0.129) (0.305)
Sample WB NMS
Number of obs. 220 560
Adjusted R-squared -0.021 0.098
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
Seasonal dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
6  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The Western Balkans have witnessed dramatic changes over the past 25 years. 
Financial integration took off somewhat later than in the NMS, but has increased 
rapidly, despite still much lower capital account openness. Capital inflows as a 
share of GDP are comparable to those observed in the NMS and are perhaps 
surprisingly diverse in terms of source countries. In both regions, FDI and bank 
lending account for the bulk of inflows as well as outflows (though the latter 
are still small in the Western Balkans), while shares of equity assets in total 
external assets are much higher than they were in the NMS at comparable levels 
of development. 
Similar to the experience of the NMS, the region experienced booming inflows 
in 2003–2007, driven by a combination of push and pull factors: a willing supply 
of funds from Western Europe and expectations of high growth in emerging 
Europe. Booming inflows provided financing and supported private sector 
development and employment, however, their sharp drop—a result of the global 
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financial crisis—and strong link with growth, point to vulnerabilities. So far, 
inflows to the Western Balkans have held up better than in the NMS, however, 
the similarities in terms of their determinants point to caution: capital inflows 
are pro-cyclical, thus potentially raising vulnerabilities by amplifying external 
shocks. 
While the paper highlighted the roles of external factors, it also illustrated 
that individual country characteristics—including growth and interest rate 
differentials, but also institutions and policies, the level of reserves, public debt 
and the degree of exchange rate flexibility—do play a role in affecting capital 
inflows. 
Given the especially strong link between growth and capital flows in the region 
and shrinking growth differentials relative to advanced economies, such policies 
and institutions become increasingly important to continue attracting much-
needed inflows. Alongside the continued search for new, sustainable sources of 
growth, countries should implement prudent fiscal policies to reduce country 
risk, and proactive macroprudential policies to limit currency mismatches and 
hence, the ramifications of a slowdown in inflows. Exchange rate flexibility 
(where available) can also help act as a shock absorber. 
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Appendix Figures
Appendix Figure 1:  Source of Portfolio Inflows, from Selected Regions and Countries, % of 
Total Inflows











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
WB inflows from the EU-15
NMS inflows from the EU-15
WB inflows from the NMS
NMS inflows from the NMS
                  2. Share of portfolio inflows to the Western Balkans from selected countries, in %
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia
FYR 
Macedonia Montenegro Serbia
Austria 0,9 5,6 15,3 10,8 10,8 4,0
Belgium 5,5 0,0 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,7
Denmark 0,4 7,9 1,0 4,7 1,6 0,7
France 7,6 0,5 5,0 0,4 12,8 2,3
Germany 2,3 2,9 18,4 14,3 2,5 10,3
Greece 24,0 0,0 0,5 3,9 0,0 12,8
Ireland 7,5 1,5 2,7 5,9 5,6 1,2
Italy 22,6 4,8 3,3 2,2 0,6 1,6
Luxembourg 10,4 30,5 13,3 18,0 37,9 15,9
Portugal 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 8,4
Spain 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
UK 3,9 5,8 9,9 4,0 1,2 11,5
NMS 0,3 0,1 2,2 0,3 1,5 0,8
Russia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 1,4 0,7
Notes: Data not available for the Netherlands on the sending side, and Kosovo on the receiving side. Panel 2 refers to 
averages over 2001–2012.
Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Appendix Figure 2:  Financial Integration and Capital Account Openness



















































































































































































Sources: External Wealth of Nations database and Chinn and Ito (2006).
Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1:  The Role of Global Factors in Explaining Average Gross Capital Inflows
Growth differential (WB - EU-14) 2.138***   1.967*** 
(0.625)   (0.601) 
Growth differential (NMS - EU-14)  1.765 ***                 
 (0.650)                 
Growth differential (WB - NMS)   0.885 0.437 
  (0.713) (0.550) 
Interest rates (EU-14) 3.577*** 3.697***  4.695*** (omitted)
(1.071) (0.955) (1.076) 
Interest rates (NMS)  -0.0661 
 (0.957) 
Interest rates (WB) -1.764*** -2.428*** (omitted)
(0.645) (0.648)
Global risk aversion (log) -1.083 -5.799*** -1.363 -2.243 
(2.028) (1.678) (2.827) (2.622) 
Change in the oil price -0.0109 0.0341 -0.0168 -0.0164 
(0.0303) (0.0282) (0.0296) (0.0266) 
Sample WB NMS WB WB
Number of obs. 63 63 63 63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425 0.562 0.319 0.424 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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Appendix Table 2:  The Role of Global Factors in Explaining Average Gross Capital Outflows
Growth differential (WB - EU-14) -0.0956   -0.265 
(0.368)   (0.317) 
Growth differential (NMS - EU-14)  0.453                 
 (0.296)                 
Growth differential (WB - NMS)   0.371 0.432* 
  (0.266) (0.257) 
Interest rates (EU-14) 0.574 1.237*** 0.736 (omitted)
(0.625) (0.416) (0.478) 
Interest rates (NMS)  0.242 
 (0.554) 
Interest rates (WB) -1.068*** -1.007*** (omitted)
(0.399) (0.424)
Global risk aversion (log) 1.754 -5.915*** 0.491 0.609 
(1.497) (1.277) (1.800) (1.570) 
Change in the oil price -0.00291 0.00201 -0.00257 -0.00261 
(0.0195) (0.0173) (0.0158) (0.0153) 
Sample WB NMS WB WB
Number of obs. 63 63 63 63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.381 0.346 0.340 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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